Posts Tagged embodiment

Embodied absence, uncanny pedagogy and prosethetic devices

00 Me Collage2

Above is a digital collage of all my presences on the web – I tried to put this up on Wallwisher a few weeks ago but I couldn’t embed it. At the time, I commented ‘my fragmented and distributed self’ and now having read Sian I can see that it is also evidence of my embodied absence on the web.

On registering on a social site, we are invariably invited – almost as a first step – to ‘upload an image’, to duplicate ourselves visually in a piece of identity work which invites artifice and play as much as ‘authenticity’ or its semblance. In that our images and profiles – and, in more visual environments, our avatars – represent a ‘re-embodiment’ within the terms of the digital, we scatter our ‘bodies’ across the web where they gain a kind of independence as nodes for commentary, connection and appropriation by others into new networks and new configurations. These versions of ourselves become representative of uncanny ‘embodied absence’ as much as ‘disembodied presence’ (Hook 2005); our actual and immediate activity on the network at any given time is less important than the presence of our representation, our ‘ghost’. p. 6

My initial view was that I was scattered in several places in cyberspace. I understood it as both evidence of the cognisphere and also as an extension of myself as a cyborg. But I found the notion of being scattered and fragmented uncomfortable – scattered and fragmented being seen as negative states. However, conceptualizing this as ‘embodied absence’ makes me happier. I see it now as having ‘bookmarks’ in several places; that my representation of myself or my avatar hold my views and musings or artefacts that I constructed which others can reflect upon and comment upon without my being present in real time. That I can have multiple conversations simultaneously yet asynchronously – bending time and mind. I feel the lifestream is important as a device to collect my scattered selves. It is a tool to help me reformulate my fragmented thinking into a new whole.

The relation to pedagogy, I would like to reflect on Usher quoting Green on learning as traditionally being seen in terms of ‘interiority’.

…Green (1993) …argues that learning has traditionally been conceived in terms of ‘interiority’, a particular kind of cognition and mental development, linked to a normative view of rationality…new technologies [can be seen ] ‘as amplifiers of human attributes and capacities, and hence of human potential; as prosthetic devices which enable learners to operate differently’ (Green 1993:28) p. 4

Usher, Robin (1998) Lost and Found: ‘cyberspace’ and the (dis)location of teaching, learning and research, Research, teaching and learning: making connections in the education of adults, SCUTREA, Exeter.

While Sian correctly pointed out during our chat session that this is another duality contrasting traditional and new approaches to learning, I think the concept of interiority is worth reflecting upon. Perhaps Green’s distinction is too sharp; that there is a place for ‘interiority’ when using new technologies in education. I would argue that in reflecting on an academic article, for example, one would go through an initial process of ‘interiority’, assessing the article in terms of one’s previous knowledge, linking it to other relevant articles etc. What is different in the idea of ‘prosethetic devices’ which enable learners to learn differently is when, for example, the student then blogs about their initial thinking about the article and is open to comments from multiple sources – not just the tutor but also fellow students as well as anyone else who cares to read the blog.

What I found accelerated learning in this course was being able to read other students’ blogs and comments. In traditional teaching essays are a private interaction between an individual student and tutor. And I wonder whether this is linked to traditional assessment criteria that the assignment has to be the work of the individual student only. However, if the objective is learning not assessment then the ‘privacy’ of individual work is no longer important. Feedback from a variety of sources is what is important. We need to let go of the notion of our ‘ownership’ of ideas. Of course, this is counter to academic career structures where you need to show evidence of your individual publications. And it might not work so well in primary and secondary education where one needs to gain confidence in one’s own ability first before sharing it for scrutiny by others – I don’t know. However, I think it is relevant for post-graduate work. For example, most research is done by teams yet we insist that dissertations and theses are sole works. A newly minted social science PhD may never had any experience of collaboration in research but that is what they are likely to do if they pursue a research career.

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Week 9 Lifestream Summary

Reflections on cyborgs, embodiment and cognispheres

This week my lifestream reflects the readings I have been doing on Gies, Badmington,  Hayles, Shields, and Muri.  I have continued with my experiment of copying out into Tumblr passages from my reading on which I wish to reflect.  My usual method is to outline writers’ ideas in MindManager – mapping out their logic.  However, in my MindManager approach I also highlight key passages so that aspect is replicated in Tumblr.  I then am able to review my selected passages in my lifestream.  I was nervous about doing this initially but I am finding it interesting.  My gleanings this week are:

Gies:

virtual selves leave many traces, are monitored, and it is difficult to maintain anonymity and multiple identities (see separate blog)

Badmington:

remnants of humanism in posthumanism

Hayles:

the cyborg is now obsolete because it is not networked enough; the notion of the cognisphere captures the dynamic relations and interactive exchanges between global  networks of machines and humans

Shields:

the cyborg can be updated but the scale should not be at the human level but at the nano-scales of biotechnology as a potential counter-space

Muri:

debunking disembodiment when bodies are everywhere etc. – separation of mind/soul from body and distaste of body has routes in Christianity; gives cynical reasons why academics have promoted the idea of disembodiment

soul leaving body 2soul leaving body

The way I decided to pull out summaries of these writers mirror the impression I get of their arguments from just reviewing the lifestream.  However, in my lifestream I also have some links to current developments that I think link  into the  literature I have read this week.

The first link raises the issue of whether the cyborg is really obsolete.

Contact lens with built-in virtual graphics (article from New Scientist)

 Contact lens with built in graphics

A contact lens that harvests radio waves to power an LED is paving the way for a new kind of display. The lens is a prototype of a device that could display information beamed from a mobile device.

Realising that display size is increasingly a constraint in mobile devices, Babak Parviz at the University of Washington, in Seattle, hit on the idea of projecting images into the eye from a contact lens.

One of the limitations of current head-up displays is their limited field of view. A contact lens display can have a much wider field of view. “Our hope is to create images that effectively float in front of the user perhaps 50 cm to 1 m away,” says Parviz.

On the one hand, this development seems to support Shield’s contention that we must look at cyborg developments at a microlevel but at the same time, it contradicts this, as the  lens is to be worn by whole human body and the visual experience will incorporate both viewing the real world AND some projected virtual world.  Will real and virtual intermingle? Is this where the cyborg joins the cognisphere? Driving while talking on the mobile phone seems safe in comparison. The body is in the real world!

IBM Press Release on Developing a Computer that can simulate the human brain

computer brain

IBM (NYSE:  IBM) announced significant progress toward creating a computer system that simulates and emulates the brain’s abilities for sensation, perception, action, interaction and cognition, while rivaling the brain’s low power and energy consumption and compact size.

The cognitive computing team, led by IBM Research, has achieved significant advances in large-scale cortical simulation and a new algorithm that synthesizes neurological data — two major milestones that indicate the feasibility of building a cognitive computing chip. 

These advancements will provide a unique workbench for exploring the computational dynamics of the brain, and stand to move the team closer to its goal of building a compact, low-power synaptronic chip using nanotechnology and advances in phase change memory and magnetic tunnel junctions. The team’s work stands to break the mold of conventional von Neumann computing, in order to meet the system requirements of the instrumented and interconnected world of tomorrow. 

As the amount of digital data that we create continues to grow massively and the world becomes more instrumented and interconnected, there is a need for new kinds of computing systems – imbued with a new intelligence that can spot hard-to-find patterns in vastly varied kinds of data, both digital and sensory; analyze and integrate information real-time in a context-dependent way; and deal with the ambiguity found in complex, real-world environments.

The last paragraph supports what Hayles is saying about the cognisphere – that most of the interaction is between machines.  A cognitive computing chip would accelerate this  process.

Cyberwar is now a fact (BBC News)

cyberwar

“To go to physical war requires billions of dollars,” he said. “To go to cyber war most people can easily find the resources that could be used in these kind of attacks.”

The targets of such future conflicts were likely to be a nation’s infrastructure, said Mr Day, because networks of all kinds were now so embedded in peoples’ lives.

In response, he said, many nations now have an agency overseeing critical national infrastructure and ensuring that it is adequately hardened against net-borne attacks.

Again, the notion of the cognisphere is supported by the statement that ‘networks of all kinds were now so embedded in peoples’ lives’.

I think Hayles is correct in saying that the unit of analysis is not the individual – whether human or cyborg – but in relationships and networks.  And that is where ultimately the cyborg metaphor fails. Individualism has been a mark of the 20th century with roots going back to  the Enlightenment.  I suggest that we are moving away from individualism but it may be painful – and the realities of cyberwars may awaken us to this movement.

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Gies, embodiment, biometrics and anonymity

biometrics physical

Gies states:

The rhetoric of digital disembodiment is manifestly at odds with the increased use of surveillance technologies which are rendering the body more traceable than ever before. p.316 citing Aas, 2006

Since 9/11 national border security has been computerized so that passports have a digital signature. In the States, visitors have their fingerprints taken and photography has been used on exiting visitors at the UK border and they are experimenting with iris identification. DNA samples are used on a regular basis to identify criminals and CCTV is ominpresent in the UK, monitoring our movements in public spaces and is regularly used in criminal investigation.  So Gies’ statement rings true in our everyday experiences.  The body is the source of identification.

He also states:

it would be wrong to suggest that it is only now that the material body is becoming fully relevant in online interactions. Embodied communication has always been present on the internet: even before broadband technology brought a global multimedia complex into the home, text-based discourse on the Internet already revolved around discursive markers capable of revealing the identity of users. p. 317

Gies argues that the way we use language reveals us online in terms of education, class, nationality and possibly gender.  But there are other behavioural biometrics that can identify us.  Handwriting has a long history of identifying individuals.  We do not reveal our handwriting online but we do reveal our keystroke behaviour. Apparently, during the Second World War British female codebreakers learned the ’voices’  of  the German telegraph transmitters. This enabled them to identify important or false information. Keystroke dynamics focus on the ‘flight time’ – the time it takes to move from one key to another, and the ‘dwell time’ – the time one spends on any one key. (MIS Biometrics wiki http://misbiometrics.wikidot.com/keystroke)

There are other behavioural biometrics that can be used to trace us online. It is also possible to recognize someone online by the strategy, knowledge and skill  used in interacting with a piece of software. There are also indirect human-computer interactions that can be analyzed such as system call traces, audit logs, program execution traces, registry access, storage activity etc. (Yampolskiy, R. and Govindaraju (2010), V.  Taxonomy of Behavioural Biometrics – http://www.igi-global.com/downloads/excerpts/34647.pdf). A problem with a number of these is that they can generate too much information to sift through.  For example, an audit log can contain CPU and I/O usage, number of connections from each location, whether a directory was accessed, a file created, another user ID changed, audit record was modified, amount of activity for the system, network and host. (Yampolskiy and Govindaraju 2010 quoting Lunt 1993) However, Yampolskiy and Govindaraju suggest that a random sample of these might be sufficient to distinguish normal behaviour from suspicious behaviour.  Yampolskiy and Govindaraju point out that a lot of effort is being put into developing behavioural biometrics as they are useful for a number of fields including marketing, game theory, security and law enforcement (p. 30).

Gies also points out that it takes a lot of skill to manage an anonymous online identity:

…it is important to point out that identity play is difficult to maintain, even in settings which afford anonymity and disembodiment: pretending to be someone else is hard work and requires considerable cultural competence. p. 318

split personality

This was borne out this week by the ’self-outing’ of Belle de Jour who has been blogging since 2003 about her secret life as a prostitute.  Her blog was so successful it led to a series of books and a television drama.  She is in fact a 34 year old research scientist who was a prostitute for 14 months to support herself while she finished her PhD.  Noone was able to discover who she was; there were theories that she was a man, that because of her writing style a number of male writers had been mooted as being her.  But in the end, the psychological constraints of maintaining a hidden identity proved too much.  As she said in her blog last Sunday:

Belle will always be a part of me. She doesn’t belong in a little box, but as a fully acknowledged side of a real person. The non-Belle part of my life isn’t the only ‘real’ bit, it’s ALL real. Belle and the person who wrote her had been apart too long. I had to bring them back together.

So a perfect storm of feelings and circumstances drew me out of hiding. And do you know what? It feels so much better on this side. Not to have to tell lies, hide things from the people I care about. To be able to defend what my experience of sex work is like to all the sceptics and doubters.

So despite her success in thwarting those who tried to trace Belle and identify who she was, it was the difficulty of maintaining  two separate identities that led to revealing herself.

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