Posts Tagged Hayles

The Fog Clears

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Thanks to Sian’s paper – Academetron, automaton, phantom: uncanny digital pedagogies (2009) – I offer the course another metaphor – the fog is clearing. Having read this, I now feel more able to get my head around the last two weeks’s analysis of cyborgs and digital culture. Let me answer this question:

“The posthuman subject is an amalgam, a collection of heterogeneous components, a material-informational entity whose boundaries undergo continuous construction and reconstruction.” (Hayles 1999, 3) One of the structuring principles of this course – the lifestream and the learning environment itself – is about disaggregation and reaggregation – taking things apart, scattering them across the network, and then having them put back together by the machine. What other connections might there be between cyborg theory and the pragmatics of online pedagogy and course design?

For me, Sian cleared the fog by discussing digital pedagogy in terms of its uncanny nature. In developing new learning environments, both learners and teachers are lifted out of the comfort zones of familiar territory. The cyborg metaphors linked to virtual environments further exacerbate the state of anomie by being such liberating entities, they offer the potential for society to re-write the script on what constitutes cultural norms. So, for example, taking the question of lifestreaming – disaggregation and reaggregation – the problem for academia, may not so much be a lifestream constitute”a collection of heterogeneous components, a material-informational entity” but instead simply represent a new form of representing learning that challenges traditional concepts of pedagogy.

Asking students to submit lifestreams as assessed elements of a programme is an attempt provisionally to capture something of the ‘spectrality’ of their digital existences. As an assessment strategy, it works with the idea of the learning process as volatile, disorienting and invigorating, and it also stretches conventional assessment frameworks to their limits. In defamiliarising the familiar through creative pedagogical appropriation of the digital, teaching becomes newly, and productively, strange.

Bayne (2009) p8

This paper has helped me formulate some clear thoughts, not only on the value of lifestreaming, but on the whole discussion of cyborg culture over the last three weeks. I see an evolution in my understanding. By beginning with Haraway, I feel the course deliberately took us to the far end of digital cultural spectrum – a dystopic image of mankind and technology merging as one, to create a neo-spacies, a posthuman. It is only by placing my disturbed emotions to one side, and forgetting about apocalyptic cyborg culture, I am able to identify how technology is enabling me to learn within new, digital environments. The problem with lifestreaming may be less to do with consigning my learning activities to a digital crumb-trail, but to familiarising myself with the capabilities and potential lifestreaming offers. A few weeks ago, I refered to my lifestream as my digital memory – a classic cyborg state. However, now I see it as simply a chronological catalogue of my online research. The production of the lifestream is not the focal point of my studies – it is what is now inside my head, my thoughts, ideas and knowledge. It is through digital mediums, I feel I have learned. The big challenge has been coming to terms with the new environment.

As a learner in higher education, the student:is in a process in which she is, in a sense, being estranged from herself… The student is asked to submit to the strangeness of new worlds opening before her. If they were not strange worlds, there would be question marks over whether we were in the presence of higher education.  

Barnet (2007) quoted in Sian (2009) p6-7

Thanks Sian.

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Andy’s Week 9 Review

Do I have to talk to you through that thing?” 

This rather profound question was directed at me by my wife this weekend, whilst I was compiling notes for my blog. The “thing” she refers to is my laptop, a technological object that nowadays forms part of my “embodiment”. To fill you in on the domestic scene, it was Saturday morning, mid November. My wife commutes to work five days a week whilst I now work from home. Since I use my laptop for both work and study, it has become an object that is very attached to me daily. My wife hates technology and holds a very functional standpoint to its application. But now it was the weekend and we were sat in the same room together, here was a perfect situation for a domestic chat. She saw an ideal opportunity to discuss Christmas and a family party. However, what now appears to be my natural state of embodiment, she found me with my head already buried in my laptop.

The relevance to digital culture continued to develop with the conversation. When challenged to make a contribution to my ideas of menus, wine, activities, etc. I did have brief discussion with my wine – but then proceeded to surf the web for 20 minutes looking at food and wine sites. Conclusion – is all my knowledge now situated in online environments? Can I no longer function in life without referring to digital sources of information? Or worse, would my poor wife find it easier to Twitter me or respond to my blog???

This quote seems to help explain my situation –

“If embodiment is an existential condition in which the body is the subjective source or intersubjective ground of experience, then studies under the rubric of embodiment are not ‘about’ the body per se. Instead they are about culture and experience insofar as these can be understood from the standpoint of bodily being-in-the-world.”

Thomas Csordas in Perspectives on Embodiment
by Weiss, G. and Haber, H., (eds.). Routledge; March, 1999 p. 143

This little domestic scene of mine occurred whilst I tried to summarise my understanding of situated knowledge, embodiment and cyborg metaphors. Haraway and Hayes can only be absorbed within my own situation. I can identify situated knowledge as knowledge specific to a particular situation. Some methods of generating knowledge, such as trial and error, or experiential learning tend to create highly situational knowledge. The knowledge prior to any experience means that there are certain “assumptions” that one takes for granted. In most realistic cases, it is not possible to have a comprehensive understanding, therefore we have to accept the fact that our knowledge is always incomplete and partial. Most real problems have to be solved by taking advantage of a partial understanding of the problem context and problem data.

 

Situated knowledge can be a challenege to the truth claims of disembodied, detached observation, and instead, advocate a more located, partial and embodied understanding. For Haraway this view rejects a masterful, all-seeing gaze from a distant vantage point, blind to its own specificity and location in its claims for objective, all-seeing authority. Situated knowledge depends on its dislocation and distance not only from what is being observed, but also from where such observation is located. By recognizing that all knowledge is partial and located, attempts to situate knowledge makes partiality and location an explicit and critical focus for both researchers and the subjects of their research. Situated knowledge seeks to disrupt the authority and impartiality that is empowered, in part, by denying its own situation. It does so by locating, and often embodying, the production of knowledge in terms of proximity rather than distance and reflexivity rather than detachment.

 

I found the two core texts by Hayles and Shields more accessible to read than Week 8 readings (although I can see the course needed to challenge us to discover Haraway for ourselves before offering us an analysis of her.) Block 3’s study of Cyborg metaphors has certainly offered some thought provoking analysis of the present and the future. It has taken me sometime to identify the relevance of Haraway and Hayles to e-learning, but now I believe I have learned rather than take everything literally, I analyse the relevance to human interaction with technology. So here, in Week 9 of the course, I find myself pausing to evaluate my own domestic social and mechanical behaviour. Have I morphed into a cyborg, with the ‘informatics of domination’ shaping how my own body – especially my mind – is being modified with technology? I can relate my personal situation – and the contrasting position of my wife – to Hayles’ text.

I regard the posthuman, like the ‘human’, as a historically specific and contingent term rather than a stable ontology. Whereas the ‘human’ has since the Enlightenment been associated with rationality, free will, autonomy and a celebration of consciousness as the seat of identity, the posthuman in its more nefarious forms is construed as an informational pattern that happens to be instantiated in a biological substrate.

Hayles 2006, p160

We propose that there are two-way or reciprocal relationships between neural events and conscious activity. An attractive feature of this proposal is that it allows consciousness to be a causally efficacious participant in the cycles of operation constituting the agent’s life…… We also propose that the processes crucial for

consciousness cut across the brain–body–world divisions rather than being located simply in the head.

To sum up these complex interactions between means and metaphor, I offer in My Mother Was a Computer (2005) the following formulation, which has become central for me in understanding the contemporary situation as well as historical precedents: ‘What we make and what (we think) we are co-evolve together.’

Hayles 2006, p164

What I find more disturbing and confusing is this Haraway quote from the Shields text.

Women-headed households, serial monogamy . . . home-based business

reinforced (simulated nuclear family, intense domestic violence). (Haraway,

1990: 170) 

Quoteed in Shields 2006, p212

As I see it, the evolution of society has created masculine and feminine positions. The relevance of Haraway is to utilise our understanding of these positions to analyse how society evolves with technology. It is not the gender perspectives that will necessary be eroded through time, but the roles and functions of gender may change. In my opinion, technology will enable greater gender equality and a decline in sexual division of labour. However, I feel I am only able to make such a proclamation through my personal situated learning – how I perceive life, my situation and the changes that are occurring around me.

My gender may be less relevant, but am I posthuman now? Am I a PC?

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Hayles – posthuman embodiment

Is Cartesian mind/body dualism, as Hayles argues of posthuman embodiment  the ultimate opposition that structures all of our debates about subjectivity and online identity?

Hayles is not the easiest of reads, but having just got to grips with Haraway, I feel I have now mastered the technique of thinking abstract and metaphoric rather than physiological reality.

“Virtuality is the cultural perception that material objects are interpenetrated by information patterns. The definition plays off the duality at the heart of the condition of virtuality – materiality on the one hand, information on the other”  (Hayles, p13-14)

Hayles appears to define virtuality as a cultural perception that relates well to the social impact of new technologies.  According to Hayles, virtuality consists of two categories – information and materiality, which are separable and discrete. The notion of “virtual embodiment” is not immediately obvious as it sounds like a contradiction in terms. How can virtuality and embodiment co-exist? In today’s society, our awareness of  bodily sensation is generally the result of  encountering the real world and not with virtual environments. However, I can also see how our  experience of embodiment  includes how our actions bring about changes in our understanding of ourselves, our emotional makeup, and our conscious and unconscious behaviours. For many people, including myself, since so much of my social interaction is via technology, it becomes difficult to retain a clear definition between reality and virtuality.

I see Hayles paper as identifying embodiment being determined by how we act. For Hayles, the body is an abstract concept that is constantly being culturally constructed. Virtuality is both a cultural and physiological construction that is constantly transforming concepts of reality. As mankind continues to interact with technology, and – it would appear through time -  merge with it, our capacity to redefine embodiment and identity will also shift. Overall, I see Hayles as inviting us to consider who we are, and who we see ourselves as being in the future.

Here’s an example of a virtual companion I found on You Tube. I offer this as an example of cultural change between human and technology. Is the woman speaking to a machine or a companion?

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